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The Service Corporation-
Who Is Taxable on Its Income:
Reconciling Assignment of
Income Principles,
Section 482, and Section 351
ELLIOTT MANNING*
In evaluating potential abuses in the creation and opera-
tion of service corporations, the courts have been unable to de-
fine the proper roles of assignment of income principles and
section 482, both of which may under certain conditions require
the taxation of such corporations' employee-shareholders, and
section 351, which shields certain transfers of income to the
corporation. The author, after an analysis of case law and rul-
ings that deal with service and other closely held corporations,
proposes a framework in which to harmonize the policies of
sections 482 and 351 in light of the assignment of income
doctrine.
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I. INTRODUCTION
A number of recent tax cases and Internal Revenue Service
rulings' have struggled with the problems of properly applying the
"assignment of income" doctrine and section 482 of the Code to
the creation and operation of various closely held corporations,
principally those that might be called service corporations ("SC").
An SC might be defined as a corporation whose principal activity
is exploiting the personal services of its founder (usually its princi-
pal shareholder), rather than manufacturing or selling goods.2 The
creation and operation of an SC involve questions of the extent to
which income that would have been taxed to the founder in the
absence of the corporation should be taxed to the corporation.
The principal argument used by the Internal Revenue Service
(the "Service") in attacking the perceived abuses in such transfers
is that the creation and operation of SC's involve the improper
"assignment of income." In some cases, however, courts have pre-
ferred to deal with the issue under section 482, which gives the
Service broad power to reallocate income among commonly con-
trolled businesses. Some courts have further considered the degree
to which section 351, which generally permits transfers of property
to controlled corporations without recognition of gain or loss, oper-
ates to limit the application of section 482.
Part of the difficulty in this area stems from the use of the
phrase "assignment of income" in at least three different ways in
1. See, e.g., Johnson v. United States, 83-1 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) $ 9120 (9th Cir. 1982);
Foglesong v. Commissioner, 35 T.C.M. (CCH) 1309 (1976), rev'd, 621 F.2d 865 (7th Cir.
1980), on remand, 77 T.C. 1102 (1981), rev'd, 691 F.2d 848 (7th Cir. 1982); Johnson v. Com-
missioner, 78 T.C. 882 (1982) (same taxpayer as in Johnson, 83-1 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) T
9120 (9th Cir. 1982), but different tax year); Keller v. Commissioner, 77 T.C. 1014 (1981),
aff'd, 723 F.2d 58 (10th Cir. 1983); Rev. Rul. 80-199, 1980-2 C.B. 122; Rev. Rul. 80-198,
1980-2 C.B. 113.
Rev. Rul. 80-198, relying quite heavily on Hempt Bros., Inc. v. United States, 490 F.2d
1172 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 826 (1974), explicitly deals with issues arising after the
1978 addition to the Code of I.R.C. § 357(c)(3) (Supp. V 1981) by Pub. L. No. 95-600, §
365(a),(c), 92 Stat. 2763, 2854-55 (1978), amended by Pub. L. No. 96-222, § 103(a)(12), 94
Stat. 194, 213 (1980). Rev. Rul. 80-199 deals with the pre-§ 357(c)(3) issues initially raised
by Raich v. Commissioner, 46 T.C. 604 (1966), and subsequently discussed in Thatcher v.
Commissioner, 533 F.2d 1114 (9th Cir. 1976), Bongiovanni v. Commissioner, 470 F.2d 921
(2d Cir. 1972), and Focht v. Commissioner, 68 T.C. 223 (1977). Rev. Rul. 80-199 rejects
important parts of Bongiovanni and Thatcher.
2. Cf. I.R.C. § 269A(b)(1) (West Supp. 1982). Section 269A was added by § 250 of the




tax analysis. The failure to recognize explicitly the three different
aspects of the assignment of income doctrine-gratvitous assign-
ment of income; transfer of rights to income earned economically
but not yet recognized for tax purposes; and transfer of rights to
income for consideration-has led courts to reject improperly the
application of at least one of its aspects. Failure to recognize the
need to harmonize the policies of sections 351 and 482-facilitating
the incorporation of businesses, while concurrently preventing the
abusive reallocations of income among controlled entities-has
caused further difficulty. This article will suggest a means by which
these policies may be reconciled.
II. RECENT CASES AND RULINGS,
A. Transfers of the Right to Collect Income Attributable to
Services of the Transferor
Several recent cases and rulings are fairly representative of the
types of federal income tax issues that are raised when a personal
service or other cash basis business is incorporated.' In Foglesong
v. Commissioner4 Frederick Foglesong, a manufacturers' represen-
tative, transferred his contracts with the manufacturers to a corpo-
ration in which he was virtually the sole common shareholder 5 and
in which his four children were preferred shareholders (as a result
of an investment of $400). The Service attacked the corporation on
three grounds: (1) that it was a sham to be disregarded for tax
purposes; (2) that all of its income should be taxed to Mr. Fogle-
song under the assignment of income doctrine of Lucas v. Earl,
and (3) that ninety-eight percent of its income should be allocated
to Mr. Foglesong under section 482.7 The Tax Court accepted the
first of these three arguments, but the United States Court of Ap-
peals for the Seventh Circuit reversed on appeal. The Seventh Cir-
cuit concluded that the corporation could not be disregarded and
that if the assignment of income doctrine were applied, the corpo-
3. See cases and revenue rulings cited supra note 1.
4. 621 F.2d 865 (7th Cir. 1980), rev'g & remanding 35 T.C.M. (CCH) 1309 (1976), on
remand, 77 T.C. 1102 (1981), rev'd, 691 F.2d 848 (7th Cir. 1982). The Foglesong case has
inspired a spate of articles, including Fever, Section 482, Assignment of Income Principles
and Personal Service Corporations, 59 TAxEs 564 (1981); McFadden, Section 482 and the
Professional Corporation: The Foglesong Case, 8 J. CoRP. TAx'N 35 (1981); Comment, Sec-
tion 482 and the Personal Service Corporation, 26 ST. Louis U.L.J. 155 (1981)..
5. Foglesong's wife and accountant each owned one share. 621 F.2d at 866.
6. 281 U.S. 111 (1930); see also infra notes 47-48 and accompanying text.
7. See text of I.R.C. § 482 (1976), infra text accompanying note 87.
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ration would, in effect, be disregarded.' In remanding the case,
however, the court of appeals instructed the Tax Court to deter-
mine that portion of the income which should be allocated to Mr.
Foglesong under section 482.' On remand, the Tax Court accepted
the Service's allocation of ninety-eight percent of the income to
Mr. Foglesong, principally because he failed to prove that a lesser
amount was approppriate. 10 On a second appeal, a different panel
of the Seventh Circuit determined that section 482 could not apply
because Mr. Foglesong as employee could not be considered a sep-
arate trade or business. Accordingly, the court remanded for con-
sideration of whether assignment of income principles could be ap-
plied to allocate to Mr. Foglesong the dividends paid to his
children and the commissions earned before incorporation but paid
to and reported by the corporation. In short, Mr. Foglesong won at
least a stalemate in the legal and factual war.
In Keller v. Commissioner," the taxpayer, Dr. Keller, was a
member of a medical partnership. He assigned his partnership in-
terest to a corporation in which he was the sole shareholder and
arranged to have the corporation establish a pension plan for him.
Under the arrangement, the corporation made the maximum per-,
missible contribution to the plan and paid Dr. Keller substantially
all of the balance of its income as salary. The basic reason for cre-
ating the corporation was to take advantage of the fact that larger
tax-free pension contributions were permitted for a corporate em-
ployee than for a partner.1
2
8. It must be noted that Mr. Foglesong was able to demonstrate nontax reasons for the
incorporation. Further, he scrupulously honored the corporate form of the transaction. 621
F.2d at 868-69. The Seventh Circuit apparently believed that application of assignment of
income principles required allocating all corporate income to Mr. Foglesong. Id. at 868. This
conclusion involves a misunderstanding of the applicable assignment of income principles,
which only require allocation to the extent income is transferred without consideration. See
infra Section IV A.
9. Id. at 872-73. Mr. Foglesong had made the transfers, which included some commis-
sions already earned, at the end of August 1966 and took no salary for the balance of that
year. The corporation chose an August 31 fiscal year-end and in succeeding years paid about
60% of the commissions in salaries. The children received over $30,000 of dividend income
on their preferred stock over a four-year period.
10. 77 T.C. at 1106.
11. 77 T.C. 1014 (1981), alf'd, 723 F.2d 58 (10th Cir. 1983).
12. Before TEFRA, pension laws greatly favored corporations over both partnerships
* and self-employed individuals. In the typical case, a doctor or an attorney formed a profes-
sional association ("P.A.") with himself as the only employee and assigned his interest in
the partnership to the P.A. The P.A. then set up a pension plan and a profit sharing plan.
There are two types of pension plans. The first type is a defined benefit plan. Annual
contributions are based on the amount of funds desired for retirement. The second type is a
defined contribution plan. Annual contributions are based on a percentage of salary. The
[Vol. 37:657
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The Service attempted to allocate all of the income to Dr. Kel-
ler under section 4821 but failed, principally because the Tax
Court determined that the aggregate compensation paid to Dr.
Keller as both salary and pension plan contributions was essen-
tially equal to the partnership share that he would have received;
thus, he satisfied the "arms-length" test of section 482." Noting
that Congress had created pension and medical reimbursement
plans to implement a specific policy, the court rejected the argu-
ment that the incorporation was improper because its principal
purpose was to obtain the benefits of these plans.1 5 Thus, Dr. Kel-
type of plan chosen depends mainly on the age of the pensioner. An older person would use
a defined benefit plan because the allowable contribution would be greater.
Partnerships and self-employed individuals are limited to H.R. 10 (Keogh) plans.
Before TEFRA the maximum contribution was the lesser of $15,000 or 15% of earned in-
come. TEFRA has substantially reduced the amount of pension contributions allowed P.A.'s
and has increased contributions for partnerships and self-employed individuals, thus sub-
stantially reducing, if not eliminating, the major incentive for forming P.A.'s. See S. REP.
No. 494, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 312-18, reprinted in 1982 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 781,
1052-59.
13. The Service also attempted to use assignment of income arguments, but the court
gave these short shrift. 77 T.C. at 1030-34. Dr. Keller also attempted to assign to the corpo-
ration income from an affiliated corporation for 1974, even though the arrangements with
the affiliated corporation were not made until 1975. Id. at 1018. Dr. Keller was held taxable
on this compensation. Id. at 1027. Six judges dissented and would have applied the assign-
ment of income doctrine to tax Dr. Keller on all of the income. Id. at 1035-45. Keller was
followed in Pacella v. Commissioner, 78 T.C. 604, 618-22 (1982).
14. The arm's-length test, as expressed in Foglesong, requires that the "actual dealings
between the [taxpayer] and the corporation reflect arm's length dealings between two un-
controlled parties." Foglesong, 77 T.C. at 1105 (citing Keller, 77 T.C. 1014 (1981), and
Achiro v. Commissioner, 77 T.C. 881 (1981)).
15. 77 T.C. at 1029-30; see Achiro v. Commissioner, 77 T.C. 881 (1981) (explicitly hold-
ing that the creation of a corporation for such purposes is not improper tax avoidance); cf.
Rev. Rul. 76-363, 1976-2 C.B. 90; Rev. Rul. 70-238, 1970-1 C.B. 61. Revenue Rulings 76-363
and 70-238 hold that the creation of a corporation to enjoy the benefits of either Subchapter
S or Western Hemisphere Trade Corporation status is not improper tax avoidance. Both
rulings are cited in Achiro, 77 T.C. at 865.
This aspect of Keller has been legislatively modified by the addition of I.R.C. § 269A to
the Code by § 250 of TEFRA. See H.R. CoN. REP. No. 760, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 633-34,
reprinted in 1982 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 1190, 1405-06. Ironically, after 1983 the
TEFRA pension amendments render § 269A ineffective against an incorporation that has as
its primary purpose the tax advantage associated with a corporate form with respect to
pensions. This is because the pension amendments remove the disparity between pension
contributions allowed for P.A.'s and self-employed individuals. See supra note 12. Further-
more, the "Blue Book" explicitly states that incorporating to obtain pension deduction ben-
efits is not an item to be taken into account for purposes of § 269A during 1983, when the
disparity will still exist. STAFF OF THE JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, 97TH CONG., 2D SEss.,
GENERAL EXPLANATION OF THE REVENUE PROVISIONS OF THE TAX EQUITY AND FIscAL RESPON-
SIBILITY TAX AcT OF 1982, at 326-27 (Comm. Print 1982). But see Prop. Treas. Regs. §
1.269A-1(d)(2)(ii) (pension benefits in excess of those available to employee-owner as indi-
vidual has a tax benefit that may result in reallocation).
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ler won both the legal and factual battles and, accordingly, the
whole war.
In Johnson v. Commissioner,16 the taxpayer, Charles Johnson,
was a basketball player who negotiated contracts, using an SC as a
financial planning device.17 The various basketball teams for which
Johnson played refused to recognize the contracts and insisted, in-
stead, that Mr. Johnson sign player contracts with them. The
teams did agree, however, to pay his salary to the corporation. The
corporation then paid Mr. Johnson a salary that was considerably
less than the amount that the teams paid to the corporation for his
services. Also, the corporation occasionally made loans to Johnson.
Applying the assignment of income doctrine, the Tax Court re-
quired Mr. Johnson to include in his income the full amount paid
by the teams. The court's apparent rationale was that the basket-
ball franchises had not recognized the contract between Johnson
and his SC. 16 The opinion, however, mentioned neither Foglesong
nor section 482. Accordingly, it is not completely clear why the
courts, and particularly the Tax Court, thought that the assign-
ment of income doctrine applied to Mr. Johnson but not to Mr.
Foglesong or Dr. Keller.19
B. Transfers of Accounts Receivable and Payable
Revenue Rulings 80-19820 and 80-19921 dealt with the incorpo-
ration of two cash basis businesses: a medical practice and a con-
tracting business. Both rulings involved transfers of accounts re-
ceivable and accounts payable. Relying heavily on Hempt Bros.,
16. 78 T.C. 882 (1982).
17. Although the opinion does not indicate who owned the corporation, Johnson did
receive liberal loans from the corporation, and, therefore, the reasonable inference is that he
was the beneficial owner. See id. at 887-88.
18. Id. at 891, 893. Although the Service in Johnson recognized the corporation as a
separate juridical entity, the other contracting party, unlike in Foglesong, did not respect
the separate corporate entity. Id. at 893. Presumably, had Johnson been able to demon-
strate that the basketball franchises respected his separate corporation, the issue would
have been framed under § 482.
19. The Foglesong court was much more liberal in its treatment of contracts between
Foglesong's corporation and the manufacturers than was the Johnson court in dealing with
the player-franchise contracts. In Foglesong, when the taxpayer formed his SC, there was no
written contract between the corporation and the manufacturers. Several months later a
written contract was prepared. Nevertheless, the court of appeals was prepared to accept
that the SC, not Foglesong, should be taxed on the income earned after incorporation but
before the new contracts were executed.
20. 1980-2 C.B. 113.
21. 1980-2 C.B. 122.
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Inc. v. United States,22 Revenue Ruling 80-198 held that the cor-
poration rather than the transferor was taxable on the receivables
when collected.
Hempt Bros. involved a mercantile, rather than a service busi-
ness, that was conducted first as a partnership and then as a cor-
poration. Because the partnership had used the cash method of ac-
counting, however, the incorporation of the business raised several
major issues that usually arise in connection with incorporating an
SC. When the corporation was forced to adopt the accrual method
of accounting required of all businesses maintaining inventories,",
the taxpayer contended that, under assignment of income princi-
ples, the former partnership should have been taxed on the ac-
counts receivable at the time of incorporation. Rejecting this argu-
ment, the court held the corporation taxable on receivables when
collected.2 Although the fact that the partnership years in ques-
tion were closed under the statute of limitations clearly influenced
the decision, the court determined that section 3512" required that
the income be taxed to the corporation rather than to the partner-
ship.20 Thus, the taxpayers in Hempt Bros. were no more success-
ful than the Servic in Foglesong and Keller in their attempt to
invoke assignment of income principles.
Revenue Ruling 80-199 explicitly deals with the definition of
liabilities under section 357(c)17 before the addition of subsection
22. 490 F.2d 1172 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 826 (1974).
23. Tress. Reg. § 1.446-1(c)(2)(i) (1957).
24. 490 F.2d at 1175-78. •
25. I.R.C. § 351 (West 1978 & Supp. 1982).
26. The Hempt Bros. case delineates a conflict between the assignment of income doc-
trine and § 351 of the Code. In Hempt Bros., the taxpayer argued that because the partner-
ship had earned the receivables, they must be taxed to the partnership. The Service argued
that the transfer of accounts receivable to the corporation was not a taxable event. Thus,
the accounts receivable had a zero basis when transferred and must be included in the cor-
poration's income when collected. The court resolved the conflict by relying on the congres-
sional policy underlying § 351-facilitating incorporations-in finding for the Service. Id. at
1177.
27. I.R.C. § 357(c)(1) (1976) provides:
(c) Liabilities in excess of basis
(1) In general
In the case of an exchange-
(A) to which section 351 applies, or
(B) to which section 361 applies by reason of a plan of reorgani-
zation within the meaning of section 368(a)(1)(D),
if the sum of the amount of the liabilities assumed, plus the amount of the liabil-
ities to which the property is subject, exceeds the total of the adjusted basis of
the property transferred pursuant to such exchange, then such excess shall be
considered as a gain from the sale or exchange of a capital asset or of property
1983]
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(c)(3) in 1978,"8 and essentially rejects the Service's victory in
Raich v. Commissioner.2 In Raich the taxpayer incorporated his
contracting proprietorship, which had been on the cash basis
method of accounting. The issue in Raich was whether he was tax-
able under section 357(c). The Service asserted that, upon incorpo-
ration, the amount of taxable gain equalled the excess of the liabil-
ities assumed by the corporation less the tax basis in the assets
transferred to the corporation. Yet the proprietorship's principal
liability was the accounts payable, which had not been taken into
account for tax purposes, and its principal asset was the accounts
receivable, which had not been taken into income and which there-
fore had a zero basis. The Tax Court held Mr. Raich taxable. Im-
plicit both in the decision and in the controversy that followed 0
was the assumption that, except for the excess of liabilities over
basis, the rationale of Hempt Bros. was correct and Raich was not
taxable on the receivables under assignment of income principles.
This assumption was perpetuated in two subsequent cases that de-
bated (1) whether the payables were includable as liabilities for the
"liabilities in excess of basis" rule of section 357(c), and (2) if these
liabilities were includable, whether taxpayers in Mr. Raich's posi-
tion were entitled to any deduction for the payables assumed. 1
The underlying assumption of Raich is also implicit in the 1978
amendment to section 357(c), 8 2 which partially settled the contro-
which is not a capital asset, as the case may be.
28. See Revenue Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-600, § 365(a), (c), 92 Stat. 2763, 2854-55
(codified as amended at I.R.C. § 357(c)(3) (Supp. V 1981)).
29. 46 T.C. 604 (1966).
30. For a description of the controversy, see S. Rzp. No. 1263, 95th Cong., 2d Seas. 183-
84, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CoNG. & AD. NEWS 6761, 6946-47, and Kahn & Oesterle, A
Definition of "Liabilities" in Internal Revenue Code Sections 357 and 358(d), 73 MICH. L.
REV. 461 (1975).
31. See Thatcher v. Commissioner, 533 F.2d 1114 (9th Cir. 1976) (liabilities are boot,
but transferor entitled to deduction for liabilities paid by transferee if payment would have
been deductible by transferor); Bongiovanni v. Commissioner, 470 F.2d 921 (2d Cir. 1972)
(payables not liabilities, because only liabilities taken into account for tax purposes count
under § 357(c)). The Tax Court in Focht v. Commissioner, 68 T.C. 223 (1977), essentially
adopts the Bongiovanni position and overrules Raich.
32. I.R.C. § 357(c)(3) (Supp. V 1981) now provides:
(3) Certain liabilities excluded
(A) In general
If a taxpayer transfers, in an exchange to which section 351 ap-
plies, a liability the payment of which either-
(i) would give rise to a deduction, or
(ii) would be described in section 736(a),
then, for purposes of paragraph (1), the amount of such liability shall
be excluded in determining the amount of liabilities assumed or to
[Vol. 37:657
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versy by excluding ordinary payables from liabilities for this
purpose.-I
In Revenue Ruling 80-198, ' the Service made explicit the im-
plicit issue in Raich. The ruling permits the transfer of unrealized
accounts payable and receivable in a section 351 tax-free exchange.
Revenue Ruling 80-198 does not apply, however, in cases where
there is an "assignment of an income right."35 The ruling cites two
cases to illustrate this point.3s The first, Brown v. Commissioner,37
involved a transfer of legal fees to a corporation owned by the
transferor and a subsequent gift of control of the corporation to
the transferor's wife;" the fees were taxed to the transferor when
collected. The other case, Rooney v. United States,39 involved a
transfer to a corporation of farm land with unharvested crops.
Subsequent to the transfer, the crops were harvested. The taxpay-
ers reported as deductions the expenses of producing the crop, but
the corporation reported the income from the sale of the crop. Sec-
tion 482 was applied to allocate the expenses to the corporation. 0
The cases and rulings briefly summarized demonstrate the
confusion as to the proper roles of the assignment of income doc-
trine and its relation to section 482 in determining the appropriate
tax treatment of an SC. The confusion stems from a failure to rec-
ognize that the two have quite different roles to perform; the fail-
ure to recognize that the assignment of income doctrine has three
distinct meanings compounds the confusion. This article will at-
tempt to clear up the confusion by exploring the meaning of the
which the property transferred is subject.
(B) Exception
Subparagraph (A) shall not apply to any liability to the extent
that the incurrence of the liability resulted in the creation of, or an
increase in, the basis of any property.
See supra note 28.
33. See Hesch, Planning For Tax-Free Exchanges Involving Partnerships and Incor-
poration of Partnerships, 41 INST. ON FED. TAx'N 15-1, 15-32 to -33 (1983) (suggesting that
the correct standard is whether disparate treatment would otherwise result depending on
the taxpayer's method of accounting); see also Orr v. Commissioner, 78 T.C. 1059 (1982)
(customer deposits held by travel agent were not § 357(c)(3) liabilities because the deposits
did not represent obligations that would be deductible when paid).
34. 1980-2 C.B. 113.
35. Id. at 115.
36. Rooney v. United States, 305 F.2d 681 (9th Cir. 1962); Brown v. Commissioner, 40
B.T.A. 565 (1939), affd, 115 F.2d 337 (2d Cir. 1940).
37. 40 B.T.A. 565 (1939), affd, 115 F.2d 337 (2d Cir. 1940).
38. Id. at 566-67.
39. 305 F.2d 681(9th Cir. 1962):'
40. Id. at 682-83, 686. For additional discussion of Rooney and Brown, see infra notes
92-93, 111-12 and accompanying text.
1983]
UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW
phrase "assignment of income" in these cases and by exploring the
proper interrelationship between the assignment of income doc-
trine and section 482. At the outset, however, it is necessary to do
as the Seventh Circuit did in the first Foglesong ap-
peal-demonstrate that an SC should properly be respected as a
separate taxable entity.
III. DISREGARD OF THE CORPORATION
In Foglesong and Keller, the Service attempted either to treat
the corporation as sham or to treat the income of the corporation
as income of the founder; these arguments are the same in sub-
stance. On the basis of the United States Supreme Court decisions
in Moline Properties v. Commissioner1 and National Carbide
Corp. v. Commissioner,4 2 the Seventh Circuit in Foglesong had lit-
tle difficulty in respecting the separate corporate entity.43 The de-
cision is correct because the recognition of a corporation, including
the one-shareholder corporation, as a separate taxable entity is
fundamental to our current tax system. Indeed, the Service's at-
tack on the separate entity of the corporation in cases like Fogle-
song is anomalous in view of the Service's major program that in-
sists on recognition of the separate corporate entity of both
nominee and agency corporations. For example, in Harrison Prop-
erty Management Co. v. United States,"' the Court of Claims cor-
rectly upheld the Service's argument that a corporation created
pursuant to a family control plan to facilitate management of
property owned by a family group was a separate corporate entity
and thus required to recognize income. The corporation, rather
41. 319 U.S. 436 (1943). Noting that a corporation must be recognized as a viable tax
entity if it was created to perform a business activity or if it carried on business activities,
the Moline Court held that gains on the sale of property were taxable to the corporation
created to facilitate financing, rather than to the corporation's owner.
42. 336 U.S. 422 (1949) (subsidiaries taxed on their earnings even though they were
under contract to turn substantially all of the profits over to their parent).
43. 621 F.2d 865 (7th Cir. 1980), rev'g & remanding 35 T.C.M. (CCH) 1309 (1976), on
remand, 77 T.C. 1102 (1981), rev'd 691 F.2d 848 (7th Cir. 1982).
44. See, e.g., Clark, The Morphogenesis of Subchapter C: An Essay in Statutory
Evolution and Reform, 87 YALE L.J. 90 (1977).
45. 475 F.2d 623 (Ct. Cl. 1973), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1130 (1974); see also Rev. Rul.
77-1, 1977-1 C.B. 161, revoking Rev. Rul. 56-542, 1956-2 C.B. 327, Rev. Rul. 68-28, 1968-1
C.B. 5, and Rev. Rul. 71-140, 1971-1 C.B. 161. The revoked revenue rulings had permitted
participants in a "cost company" to take certain deductions and credits attributable to the
property of the cost company. Rev. Rul. 77-1, to the contrary, recognizes cost companies as
separate taxpaying entities. See generally Miller, The Nominee Conundrum: The Live
Dummy is Dead, but the Dead Dummy Should Live!, 34 TAx L. REv. 213 (1979).
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than the individual shareholders, was therefore entitled to the de-
ductions attributable to ownership. Had the corporation been con-
sidered a mere agent or nominee, the deductions would have been
available instead to the individual owners.4
IV. ASSIGNMENT OF INCOME PRINCIPLES
The application of assignment of income principles is compli-
cated by the phrase being used to describe three related but dis-
tinct issues: (1) the gratuitous assignment of income (usually in-
come not yet earned economically)-principally a question of to
whom income is taxed; (2) the transfer of rights to income that has
been earned economically but not yet recognized for tax pur-
poses-frequently a question whether income will escape taxation
because of tax accounting principles; and (3) the transfer of rights
to income for consideration in transactions that seek to convert or-
dinary income into capital gain-a question of the character of in-
come to the taxpayer at the time of receipt. This article is con-
cerned principally with the first two of these issues.
A. Gratuitous Assignment of Income
The first major aspect of the assignment of income doctrine
involves the gratuitous assignment of income earned by the ser-
vices or property of the transferor. The gratuitous assignment of
income doctrine and the descriptive fruit and tree analogy both
stem from the Supreme Court decision of Lucas v. Earl.4 7 In that
case, pursuant to a non tax-motivated agreement,48 Earl assigned
to his wife a one-half interest in his future earnings. The Earls
each reported one-half of Mr. Earl's $192,000 salary. This saved
taxes because there was no income splitting in the years in ques-
tion.4 9 The Supreme Court reasoned that Mr. Earl's service income
could be taxed only to the earner. Therefore, Mr. Earl was re-
quired to report the entire income in the years earned. No effect
was given to the "arrangement by which the fruits are attributed
46. See Roccaforte v. Commissioner, 77 T.C. 263 (1981), rev'd, 708 F.2d 986 (5th Cir.
1983).
47. 281 U.S. 111 (1930).
48. It took place in 1901 before there was an income tax, which, of course, followed the
sixteenth amendment in 1913.
49. The joint return privilege with its income splitting feature was added by the Reve-
nue Act of 1948, Pub. L. No. 80-471, § 301, 62 Stat. 110, 114 (current version at I.R.C. §§ 1,
6013 (1976 & Supp. V 1981)).
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to a different tree from that on which they grew."5
This doctrine was extended to property income in Helvering v.
Horst.1 Mr. Horst detached interest coupons from bonds that he
continued to own and gave them to his son. The Supreme Court
held that Mr. Horst, rather than his son, was taxable on the in-
come when the interest was collected.5 2 There have been many
cases seeking to delimit what constitutes an adequate property
transfer outside the Horst doctrine, the examination of which is
beyond the scope of this article.53 It is important to note, however,
that in all of these cases, the transfers were gratuitous."
An opposite finding would obtain if an arm's-length considera-
tion were supplied for the transfer. Thus, in either Horst or Earl, if
the transferee had paid the transferor the discounted value of the
future income at the time of the assignment, there is little doubt
that each transferor would have been taxed upon receipt of the
consideration (assuming that the present income tax laws were in
effect at the time).55 Similarly, the transferee would have been
50. 281 U.S. at 115. The fruit and tree analogy of the case has been a potent and persis-
tent one in the federal income tax law. See, e.g., Lyon & Eustice, Assignment of Income:
Fruit and Tree as Irrigated by the P.G. Lake Case, 14 MAJOR TAx. PLAN. 47, 65-70 (1962).
51. 311 U.S. 112 (1940).
52. There is some language in the opinion that would imply that the taxable event was
the transfer. See id. at 116-18.
53. See generally Lyon & Eustice, supra note 50, at 58-60.
54. In fact, the Earls' contract contained an agreement to split their property and any
income from that property as well as all earnings. The government respected the splitting of
the income from the property but not from the services. The reason for the distinction is
not clear. The taxpayer's argument was cast more in terms of the contract's having trans-
ferred to Mrs. Earl a beneficial property interest that should be respected for federal income
tax purposes, rather than in terms of her having purchased such rights. Thus, the salary
transfer was discussed as if it were separate from the property transfer, which appears
sound since Mrs. Earl's property at the time was $30,000 and Mr. Earl's was apparently
considerably more, so that it would have been hard to treat her transfer as consideration for
the salary transfer. See Earl v. Commissioner, 10 B.T.A. 723 (1928).
55. Cf. Pounds v. United States, 372 F.2d 342 (5th Cir. 1967) (broker taxed on collec-
tion of one-half of commission purchased from co-broker); G.C.M. 24849, 1946-1 C.B. 66.
Assignments of income rights by the earner for cash or property, measured by
the then worth of such rights, may not be disregarded, and as respects such
earner-assignor, he has elected to anticipate normal realization by assigning or
discounting such right. Consideration received by him represents ordinary in-
come realized by him upon the anticipatory assignment of his right to income.
Once such rights to income from property or for services are separated from the
earner by his act of assignment, they become property rights owned by the pur-
chaser or assignee with a basis in his hands measured by the consideration paid.
Thus, any discounting of the face value of the income right or claim by the
earner thereof upon the assignment will result in income to the assignee when




taxed on the amount received as salary or interest, but only to the
extent that the payments received exceeded the consideration
given." This is entirely proper; the difference between the amount
paid and that received represents either interest earned by the re-
cipient from having paid the consideration in advance of collection
(i.e., the time value of money) or, possibly, in a case like Earl in
which the amount to be collected was uncertain, a good bargain.
In the case of a transfer to a wholly owned SC, the transfer is
not gratuitous. The value of the stock received or the increase in
the value of stock already owned,' 7 of necessity, equals the value of
the income transferred. Whether such transfer or receipt is taxable
will be discussed below.58
B. Transfer of the Right to Collect Economically Earned
Income and the Clear Reflection of Income Doctrine
The second major aspect of the assignment of income doctrine
involves income earned economically, but not "earned" for tax
purposes; it is therefore properly called the "transfer of the right
to collect economically earned income." The term "economically
earned income" comprehends (1) income that has been earned but
has not yet been reported for tax purposes because of the tax-
payer's accounting method, and (2) amounts previously written off
as losses or expenses that are subsequently recovered by the tax-
payer. The principal questions litigated in this area involve corpo-
rate dividend and liquidating distributions, which may be consid-
ered, in a broad sense, gratuitous transfers.
1. RIGHT TO COLLECT ECONOMICALLY EARNED INCOME
Some of the early cases dealing with the transfer of the right
to collect economically earned income relied on the gratuitous as-
signment of income doctrine. 59 Nevertheless, the real issue is
56. Cf. Stranahan v. Commissioner, 472 F.2d 867 (6th Cir. 1973) (father taxed in 1964
on proceeds received from son representing discounted value of dividends sold to son; son
reported full dividends received in 1965, offset by payment to father-the Service had con-
tended that the transaction represented a loan and that the father was taxable in 1965,
when the dividends were collected).
57. Cf. Pvt. Ltr. Rul. 7935115 IRS L'TrR RUL. REP. (CCH) No. 131 (May 31, 1979) (on
gratuitous transfer of stock by family member to corporation, the amount of gift for gift tax
purposes to other family members who owned stock in corporation was measured by the
excess of value of stock transferred, over increase in value of retained stock).
58. See infra notes 102, 115-18 and accompanying text; see also note 84.
59. See, e.g., Commissioner v. First State Bank, 168 F.2d 1004 (5th Cir.), cert. denied,
335 U.S. 867 (1948).
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whether the clear reflection of income requires that income be re-
ported at the time of the transfer even though it would not nor-
mally have been reported then, absent a transfer. The leading case
in this area is Commissioner v. First State Bank of Stratford.e0
That case involved a bank's distribution of promissory notes that
had been written off as worthless in a prior tax year, but that later
recovered their value. Had the bank collected the notes, clearly it
would have had to recognize the income element under the tax
benefit theory. 1 The bank contended that the distribution of the
notes did not result in recognition of income under the principle of
General Utilities & Operating Co. v. Helvering62 that a corpora-
tion does not realize or recognize income on distributions to its
shareholders. The court of appeals held that, under the assignment
of income doctrine, the bank had to recognize income when the
notes were collected by the shareholders. The court relied on Horst
even though there was no separation of the fruit from the tree
when the notes together with their corresponding interest element
were distributed rather than merely the interest element.
Unlike cases involving gratuitous assignments of income
(where the issue is to whom the income will be taxed), a major
issue in those distributions is whether the income will be taxed.
The distribution would escape taxation entirely unless taxed upon
distribution because the shareholders' tax basis in the notes is gen-
erally the notes' fair market value."8
Although the court in First State Bank applied gratuitous as-
signment of income principles in taxing the collections on the
notes when received by the shareholders, later cases, generally aris-
60. Id.
61. See Alice Phelan Sullivan Corp. v. United States, 381 F.2d 399 (Ct. Cl. 1967) (cor-
poration taxed on return of property previously given to charity at amount of deduction
previously taken, even though tax in year of return was higher than tax saving in year of
original gift); see also infra note 66-80 and accompanying text. See generally Bittker &
Kanner, The Tax Benefit Rule, 26 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 265 (1981).
62. 296 U.S. 200, 205-06 (1935). Although the General Utilities case is generally cited
for this principle, the only substantive issue decided by the Supreme Court was that the
court of appeals had erred in attributing to the corporation a subsequent sale of distributed
property. The basis for the reversal was that the court of appeals did not properly have
before it the question of a subsequent sale. The Board of Tax Appeals and the court of
appeals assumed that the distribution would be taxable only if the resolution declaring it
had fixed a dollar amount. They had held that the resolution did not so provide.
63. I.R.C. § 301(d)(1) (1976 & Supp. V 1981) provides that the basis of property re-
ceived as a dividend distribution by a noncorporate distributee is its fair market value. Al-
though the provision is new in the 1954 Code, the legislative history indicates that it is a
declaration of existing law. See H.R. REP. No. 1337, 83rd Cong., 2d Sess. A70-71, reprinted
in 1954 U.S. CODE CONO. & ADMIN. N.ws 4017, 4207.
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ing under sections 334(b)(2) and 336,64 have taxed the income at
time of distribution or upon a nonrecognition sale under section
337.65 The latter is the more correct approach because the transac-
tions are not ones involving transfer of basis, which indicates that
the recipient of the distribution or the buyer is considered a sepa-
rate and independent taxpayer whose collections should not relate
back to the transferor.
2. PREVIOUSLY EXPENSED ITEMS
Taxation of distributions and liquidation sales, under the as-
signment of income theory, is closely related to taxation of previ-
ously expensed items, such as small tools and supplies, in these
transactions." In the liquidation-sale context, the courts and the
Service normally invoke the tax benefit rule and generally tax the
recovery of previously deducted amounts where the prior deduc-
tion resulted in a tax benefit.6 7 Until the Supreme Court's decision
in Hillsboro National Bank v. Commissioner,8 there was contro-
versy concerning the kind of "recovery" required to invoke the
rule.
Some courts, most notably the United States Court of Appeals
for the Ninth Circuit, had refused to apply the tax benefit princi-
ple to liquidations on the theory that a corporation has no recovery
when it makes a distribution in liquidation." Others, most notably
64. I.R.C. § 336 West 1978 & Supp. 1982 provides, with certain exceptions, that no gain
or loss is recognized by the distributing corporation on distributions in complete liquidation.
There is no general exception for distributions in which the basis to the distributee is deter-
mined by reference to the basis of recently purchased stock. See, e.g., I.R.C. § 334(b)(2)
(1976) (repealed 1982). TEFRA replaced § 334(b)(2) with § 338, Pub. L. No. 97-248, §
224(a), 96 Stat. 324, 485 (West Supp. 1982). Section 338 provides for a similar step-up in
basis by election rather than by liquidation, and it explicitly applies § 337 for determining
the consequences of a hypothetical transfer of assets. I.R.C. § 337 (West 1978 & Supp. 1982)
generally provides for nonrecognition of gain or loss on sales by a liquidating corporation.
65. Midland-Ross Corp. v. United States, 485 F.2d 110 (6th Cir. 1973) (construction
corporation using completed contract method of accounting taxed in year of sale, under
I.R.C. § 337, on completed contracts transferred); see Williamson v. United States, 292 F.2d
524 (Ct. Cl. 1961) (cash basis corporation taxed in year of liquidation on accounts receivable
distributed to shareholders; year of collection not shown). But see Siegel v. United States,
464 F.2d 891 (9th Cir. 1972), cert. dismissed, 410 U.S. 918 (1973); Sol C. Siegel Prod., Inc. v.
Commissioner, 46 T.C. 15 (1966) (cash basis corporation, which remained in existence after
a liquidating distribution of contract rights, was taxable in year of collection, not in year of
distribution).
66. See infra notes 82-86 and accompanying text.
67. See supra note 61 and accompanying text.
68. Hillsboro Nat'l Bank v. Commissioner, 103 S. Ct. 1134 (1983).
69. See Bliss Dairy, Inc. v. United States, 645 F.2d 19 (9th Cir. 1981) (per curiam),
rev'd & remanded sub nom. Hillsboro Nat'l Bank v. Commissioner, 103 S. Ct. 1134 (1983);
1983]
UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW
the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit,7 had
found that recovery was not required to apply the principle, but
found taxable those events inconsistent with prior deductions. The
distribution in liquidation of previously expensed items that still
have value is inconsistent with the prior deduction and is an exam-
ple of such a taxable event. This result was approved in Hillsboro,
although with some narrowing-the subsequent event must be
"fundamentally inconsistent with the premise on which the deduc-
tion was initially based. '7' The tax benefit doctrine, so limited, es-
sentially applies tax accounting principles and determines that
taxation at the time of the distribution is necessary to clearly re-
flect income as required by Code section 446(b).7' Although the
Court did not rely on this section, doing so would have clarified the
opinion.73
3. RESERVES FOR BAD DEBTS
A superficially similar application of the section 446(b) clear
reflection of income issue was involved in Nash v. United States.4
In Nash an accrual basis partnership that had established a bad
debt reserve was incorporated. The Service contended that the re-
Commissioner v. South Lake Farms, Inc., 324 F.2d 837 (9th Cir' 1963), nonacq., 1977-2 C.B.
2. In Rev. Rul. 74-396, 1974-2 C.B. 106, the Service disagreed with the Ninth Circuit's re-
quirement of "recovery" as expressed in Commissioner v. South Lake Farms, Inc., 324 F.2d
837 (9th Cir. 1963). The Service clarified its position, in Rev. Rul. 77-67, 1977-1 C.B. 33, by
explaining that it had acquiesced to the Tax Court's decision in South Lake, 36 T.C. 1027
(1961), because the "tax benefit" issue was raised on appeal only. See Comment, The Tax
Benefit Rule: Recovery Reevaluated, 36 U. MIAMI L. REv. 533 (1982). Regardless, the Su-
preme Court's Hillsboro decision has settled the issue, ostensibly at least, in favor of the
Service. See infra text accompanying notes 70-73.
70. See Tennessee-Carolina Transp., Inc. v. Commissioner, 582 F.2d 378 (6th Cir.
1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 909 (1979); see also Hillsboro Nat'l Bank v. Commissioner, 641
F.2d 529 (7th Cir. 1981), rev'd, 103 S. Ct. 1134 (1983).
71. 103 S. Ct. at 1143 (footnote omitted).
72. I.R.C. § 446(b) (1976) provides that "if the method [of accounting] used does not
clearly reflect income, the computation of taxable income shall be made under such method
as, in the opinion of the Secretary, does clearly reflect income."
73. In a dissenting opinion, Justice Stevens protested, "I cannot tell whether or why the
fundamentally inconsistent event theory prefers LIFO accounting over FIFO." 103 S. Ct. at
1162-63. Because LIFO and FIFO are simply methods of determining inventory cost and do
not involve deductions, an event such as distribution in liquidation cannot be "inconsis-
tent," whereas distribution of gain that has previously been deducted is. See infra text ac-
companying note 83. Recognizing this distinction, Rev. Rul. 74-431, 1974-2 C.B. 107, held
that there is no need to include the difference between LIFO and FIFO amounts in a sale
under § 337. The amendment adding what are now § 336(b) and § 337(f), however, changes
the result of the ruling. See Pub. L. No. 96-223, § 403(b)(1), (2)(A), 94 Stat. 229, 304-05
(1980).
74. 398 U.S. 1 (1970).
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serve had to be included in the partnership's income upon incorpo-
ration because the partnership, no longer being in business, no
longer needed the reserve. The Service's argument was made with-
out regard to whether the fair market value of the receivables was
equal to their gross or net book value (face amount of receivables
reduced by the reserve for bad debts), or to some other relevant
amount. The Supreme Court held that such an adjustment was not
required absent evidence that the receivables were worth more
than their net book value. Although the Court cast its decision in
terms of an absence of a recovery, it also referred to the nonrecog-
nition provisions of section 3515 as a secondary basis of its opin-
ion. If the nonrecognition rules with their corollary of transferred
basiS76 are taken into account, then even if the receivables have a
fair market value greater than their net book value, nothing will
escape taxation. This is because the transferee-corporation will
have to report the excess in the form of reduced future additions
to the bad debt reserve. Accordingly, the Service should not re-
quire the reserve to be taken into income when there is a carryover
basis, regardless of whether the receivables have a fair market
value equal to or greater than their net book value. This is implic-
itly, although unfortunately not explicitly, recognized in a trilogy
of revenue rulings issued in response to Nash."
In the first two rulings, which dealt respectively with liquida-
tions under sections 332 and 334(b)(2) 7 and with liquidation sales
under section 33779 two situations are considered. In the first situ-
ation, the receivables have a fair market value equal to their net
book value. In the second, the fair market value exceeds the net
book value. Applying tax benefit principles, both rulings hold that
no amount need be included in income in the first situation, but in
the second situation, the excess of the fair market value over the
net book value must be included in income. In the third ruling,
which dealt with a section 351 transfer, the only situation consid-
75. I.R.C. § 351(a) (Supp. V 1981) provides, "No gain or loss shall be recognized if
property is transferred to a corporation by one or more persons solely in exchange for stock
or securities in such corporation and immediately after the exchange such person or persons
are in control (as defined in section 368(c)) of the corporation."
76. I.R.C. § 358 (1976 & Supp. V 1981) provides that the basis of property to the trans-
feree in a transfer governed, inter alia, by § 351, will be the basis in the hands of the trans-
feror adjusted for gain recognized.
77. See Rev. Rul. 78-80, 1978-2 C.B. 139; Rev. Rul. 78-279, 1978-2 C.B. 135; Rev. Rul.
78-278, 1978-2 C.B. 134.
78. Rev. Rul. 78-278, 1978-2 C.B. 134.
79. Rev. Rul. 78-279, 1978-2 C.B. 135.
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ered is one where the fair market value equals the net book value
of the receivables.80 The ruling holds that the transferor need not
include anything in income. The ruling continues by detailing the
treatment of the transferee-corporation, depending on whether the
reserve or the specific charge-off method is used to account for re-
ceivables. If the reserve method is used, the transferee must, for
tax purposes, carry the receivables at face value less the reserve for
bad debts. The reserve is nondeductible to the transferee-corpora-
tion as it has already been deducted by the transferor. If the spe-
cific charge-off method is used, the transferee must, for tax pur-
poses, carry the receivables at their, basis, net of the reserve. The
reserve must be allocated ratably to the fair market value of the
receivables in the absence of some other basis for allocation. These
accounting principles could be applied equally as well to the sec-
ond situation-where the receivables have a fair market value
greater than their net book value. In short, the section 351 transfer
is not an event inconsistent with the prior deduction, whereas a
section 334(b)(2) liquidation and a section 337 liquidation sale are
inconsistent because the transferee gets a fair market value basis
rather than a transferred basis.
4. CLEAR REFLECTION OF INCOME
The same rationale should apply where a right to collect eco-
nomically earned income is transferred. In transactions under sec-
tion 351, the existence of a transferred basis obviates the need to
require immediate recognition to clearly reflect income because the
transferee will report it in due course.81 Conversely, in transactions
under sections 337, 338, and old 334(b)(2), as well as under sec-
tions 311 and 333," the tax must be collected at the time of the
distribution because there is no carryover of basis; otherwise the
80. Rev. Rul. 78-280, 1978-2 C.B. 139.
81. See the discussion of Rev. Rul. 80-198, supra notes 1, 20-26, 30-40 and infra notes
110-12 and accompanying text.
82. I.R.C. § 311 (West 1978 & Supp. 1982) provides for nonrecognition of gain to the
distributing corporation on dividend distributions and on certain redemptions. In the case
of a dividend, the basis to the distributee is generally the fair market value. I.R.C. § 301(d)
(1976 & Suppl. V 1981); see supra note 63. In the case of a redemption, the distributee's
basis is the fair market value because the distributee recognizes gain on the transaction
under § 1011. See I.R.C. 302(a) (West Supp. 1982). I.R.C. § 333 (1976) provides generally for
nonrecognition of gain to the distributee on certain one-month liquidations, with basis equal
to the distributee's basis in the stock under § 334(c). Section 333 was involved in Bliss
Dairy, 645 F.2d 19 (9th Cir. 1981) (per curiam), rev'd & remanded sub nom. Hillsboro Nat'l
Bank v. Commissioner, 103 S. Ct. 1134 (1983). See supra note 69.
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opportunity to tax vanishes.
That the items will otherwise escape taxation is not sufficient
in itself to require inclusion in income, as the cited sections are all
general nonrecognition provisions. They state that no gain or loss
is to be recognized in transactions subject to their provisions. It
must be remembered, however, that we are dealing here with a
rather narrow group of items. The transfer of the right to collect
economically earned income includes such items as accounts re-
ceivable that already have been earned in economic or accounting
terms, but that have not been reported yet because of the use of
the cash or some other special method of accounting (such as the
completed-contract method). The tax benefit cases generally con-
cern such items as small tools and other supplies that normally
should be deducted .only as used, but that as a matter of adminis-
trative convenience, are permitted to be deducted on purchase.83
In each case, the permitted accounting practices distort income to
some degree, but the distortion is acceptable in the ordinary course
of business because eventually there will be either an inclusion in
income or the items will be exhausted without further deduction.
Only a timing matter is involved. When an event occurs that
means there will never be the normally expected "day of reckon-
ing," immediate inclusion in income is required.
When it is recognized that a question of proper tax accounting
is involved, rather than whether a nonrecognition provision should
be applied or an "exception" created, these cases become quite
simple.8' All of the items should be reported when, and only when,
an event inconsistent with the accounting practice occurs. A trans-
fer of such items without a transfer of basis is such an event; a
transfer with a transferred basis generally is not.85 As was indi-
83. See Treas. Reg. § 1.162-3 (1958).
84. In one sense, the application of a nonrecognition provision involves the third aspect
of the assignment of income doctrine-the characterization of the receipt when there has
been a transfer of an income right in exchange for consideration. The taxpayers in Hempt
Bros., Inc. v. United States, 490 F.2d 1172 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 826 (1974), in-
voked Commissioner v. P.G. Lake, Inc., 356 U.S. 260 (1958) (holding that amounts received
for a "carve-out" of oil or mineral payments are ordinary income, not capital gain), in argu-
ing that the partnership receivables were taxable to the partnership. The Court determined
that the congressional policy underlying § 351 overrides the assignment of income doctrine
and makes the receipt of stock in a § 351 transaction a nonrecognition event. See supra
notes 22-26 and accompanying text.
85. The importance of this distinction is recognized in § 247 of TEFRA, Pub. L. No. 97-
248, § 247 (not codified in the I.R.C.), which permits liquidation of certain personal service
corporations under I.R.C. § 333 (1976) without the recognition of unrealized receivables (as
would normally be the case), subject to the requirement that the receivables be assigned a
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cated above, the Supreme Court implicitly recognized this in Hills-
boro."' Thus, except to the extent that section 482 applies, there is
no reason to apply any different approach in taxing SC's.
V. SECTION 482
The final provision that must be considered in determining
the proper taxation of SC's is section 482 of the Code, which
provides:
In any case of two or more organizations, trades, or busi-
nesses (whether or not incorporated, whether or not organized in
the United States, and whether or not affiliated) owned or con-
trolled directly or indirectly by the same interests, the Secretary
may distribute, apportion, or allocate gross income, deductions,
credits, or allowances between or among such organizations,
trades, or businesses, if he determines that such distribution,
apportionment, or allocation is necessary in order to prevent
evasion of taxes or clearly to reflect the income of any such orga-
nizations, trades, or businesses."7
The application of section 482 thus requires that there be two
or more trades or businesses and that they be commonly controlled
by the same interests. Once these two elements are met, section
482 permits the allocation of income and deductions to reflect in-
come clearly and to prevent tax evasion.
A. Two (or More) Trades or Businesses
As to the first requirement, a question has arisen as to
whether a shareholder who also is an employee of the corporation
is engaged in two separate trades or businesses, permitting the al-
location of income to him from his controlled corporation. Al-
though the courts, beginning with the case of Ach v. Commis-
sioner,88 have approached this issue somewhat gingerly, in Keller
and Foglesong the Tax Court correctly assumed that the answer is
"yes." On the other hand, the Seventh Circuit in the second Fogle-
song appeal reached the opposite conclusion. It reasoned that "or-
zero basis.
86. See supra text accompanying notes 68-73.
87. I.R.C. § 482 (1976).
88. 358 F.2d 342 (6th Cir. 1966), afg 42 T.C. 114 (1964), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 899
(1966); see also Rubin v. Commissioner, 56 T.C. 1155 (1971) (explicitly stating that it did
not find employee status constituting, in and of itself, a trade or business, but nevertheless
allocating income to shareholder-employee under § 482).
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ganization" in section 482 requires a business entity of indepen-
dent significance and requires that the employee have some
business operation other than services as a corporate employee.89
This approach is too narrow. Since for many other purposes it is
recognized that an employee is engaged in a trade or business, 90
there is no reason why a shareholder-employee should not be so
recognized. Furthermore, external activities by an employee (i.e.,
whether he is otherwise engaged in separate activities that can be
characterized as a separate business) are irrelevant to the alloca-
tion of income related to his services to the corporation. On the
other hand, if the shareholder is not also an employee, it is some-
what difficult to see any reason for allocating income to him.91
B. Control
The second requirement, that the businesses be controlled by
the same interests, provides one of the principal reasons why sec-
tion 482 cannot answer all SC taxation problems and why the gra-
tuitous assignment of income doctrine is still needed. This appears
to have been the Service's initial concern in Revenue Ruling 80-198
when it limited that ruling to instances where the iransfer involves
"an assignment of an income right. 91 2 The ruling cites Brown v.
Commissioner," which involved a transfer to a corporation of the
right to collect a legal fee, followed by the transfer of that corpora-
tion's stock to the transferor's wife. The revenue ruling cites
Brown for two propositions: first, that such a transaction properly
involves the application of Lucas v. Earl (assignment of income)
principles in a section 351 transfer and, second, that the transfer of
a legal fee to a corporation not. engaged in business is an example
89. 691 F.2d 848 (7th Cir. 1982).
90. See, e.g., United States v. Generes, 405 U.S. 93 (1972) (recognizing that if the domi-
nant motive of a -loan by a shareholder-employee to the corporation were to protect his
employee status, loss on nonpayment would be deductible as a business bad debt; the Court,
however, made a finding of fact that such dominant motive was not present and that the
loss was nonbusiness).
91. See Davis v. Commissioner, 64 T.C. 1034 (1975) (orthopedic surgeon not taxed on
income of x-ray and physical therapy corporations, 90% of the stock of which was owned by
his minor children, when he did not render substantial services to the corporations). The
result of this case may be affected by I.R.C. § 269A added by TEFRA. See supra note 2.
But see Horn v. Commissioner, 1982 TAx CT. MEM. DEC. (P-H) 82,741 (Dec. 28, 1982)
(allocating x-ray corporation's income to orthopedic professional corporation, where x-ray
corporation had no employees or activities separate from the professional corporation).
92. See supra note 35 and accompanying text.
93. 40 B.T.A. 565 (1939), aff'd, 115 F.2d 337 (2d Cir. 1940); see supra notes 37-38 and
accompanying text.
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of tax avoidance. The ruling confuses two ideas. The transfer of
the stock to the wife (or any transfer to a corporation owned by
the wife) should properly have triggered the gratuitous assignment
of income principle.9 4 The limitations in Revenue Ruling 80-198
demonstrate that the first panel of the court of appeals in Fogle-
song incorrectly rejected the application of that doctrine. Assume
that, in the Foglesong case, Mr. Foglesong had not retained the
common stock of the corporation but had arranged for all of the
stock to be owned by his children. Section 482 then should not
apply as there would be no control by the same interests (unless it
might be possible to equate Mr. Fogelsong's children with Mr.
Fogelsong). 95
Equating Mr. Foglesong with his children considerably strains
the concept of their separate identities. In many other contexts,
the courts have been reluctant to find an identity of interest be-
tween members of a family, absent specific statutory attribution
rules.9 Statutory language more definite than the general words
"same interests" is required before courts find that a parent and
his children are the "same interests.
'e7
94. In this respect, the decision in Brown does not support the argument that the trans-
fei of the stock to the wife was important. On rehearing the court explicitly stated that the
assignment of income doctrine' was used under the assumption that Mr. Brown was the.
stockholder. This aspect of the case was implicitly rejected in Hempt Bros. and in Rev. Rul.
80-198. The other aspect, that the transfer had nothing to do with the business of the trans-
feree corporation, is more properly a § 482 issue. See infra note 112 and accompanying text.
95. Cf. Burr Oaks Corp. v. Commissioner, 365 F.2d 24 (7th Cir. 1966), af'g 43 T.C. 635
(1965), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 1007 (1967). In Burr Oaks, the husbands and a brother of the
owners of a corporation's common stock transferred property to the corporation in exchange
for corporate notes. The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed the Tax Court's
holding that the notes were preferred stock and that the transferors were members of the
control group for purposes of § 351, even though their preferred stock had no vote. The
court of appeals emphasized that the transferors exercised practical control of the corpora-
tion. In view of the finding that the notes were preferred stock, however, this seems unnec-
essary because the definition of control in I.R.C. § 368(c) (1976) includes nonvoting stock
(whether common or preferred). Accordingly, the principle of Rev. Rul. 73-472, 1973-2 C.B.
114 and Rev. Rul. 73-473, 1973-2 C.B. 115-which excludes from the control group transfer-
ors who had only debt securities-would not apply.
96. See, e.g., In re Estate of Lukens, 246 F.2d 403 (3d Cir. 1957), aff'g 26 T.C. 900
(1956) (The court did not treat a father's redemption of part of his stock as equivalent to a
dividend, even though the remainder of the stock was owned by family members. The court
recognized, however, that the result of the case, which was decided under § 115(g) of the
Internal Revenue Code of 1939, would be changed by §§ 302 and 318 of the 1954 code).
97. See, e.g., I.R.C. § 704(e)(3) (1976); id. § 1366(e) (West Supp. 1982) (formerly §
1375(c) (1976)). These provisions deal with family partnerships and family groups in sub-
chapter S corporations, and specifically authorize allocation to recognize the value of ser-
vices of a family member. Section 269A added by TEFRA, see supra note 2, also explicitly
authorizes the allocation of income of certain personal service corporations to their em-
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In cases where section 482 cannot apply because of lack of
control, however, the assignment of income doctrine works quite
well. Thus, in the hypothetical, to the extent that Mr. Foglesong
did not receive or own stock in the transferee corporation which is
increased in value by his services, allowing the corporation to col-
lect the value of his services without adequate compensation is
clearly a gratuitous assignment, and Mr. Foglesong should be taxed
on the transferred income; but it is not within section 482. This
was recognized by the second panel in Foglesong, which, after re-
fusing to apply section 482, remanded the case for application of
assignment of income principles to commissions earned before in-
corporation and to dividends paid to Mr. Foglesong's children. As
a practical matter, the Tax Court should determine the amount on
which Mr. Foglesong should be taxed on the basis of considera-
tions similar to those discussed below for the application of section
482 (i.e., the degree to which he has been adequately compensated
for his services)." In this regard, the approach of the second panel
is too narrow because it seeks to tax him only on dividends distrib-
uted to his children and not on the income of the corporation accu-
mulated for future distribution to them; thus, this approach grants
Mr. Foglesong, at a minimum, an improper tax deferral until dis-
tribution of the accumulated income.
C. Allocation of Income
The third and most important element of section 482 is the
ability of the Secretary to allocate income to prevent tax evasion or
to reflect clearly the income of the trades or businesses involved.
The concept of clearly reflecting income is somewhat different in
the section 482 context than in transfer of rights to economically
earned income where the doctrine is applied to prevent timing
rules from allowing tax avoidance."e The regulations indicate that
section 482 is designed to determine the "true taxable income...
which means, in the case of a controlled taxpayer, the taxable in-
come .. .which would have resulted to the controlled taxpayer,
had it in the conduct of its affairs . . . dealt with the other mem-
ber or members of the group at arm's length."100 Thus the general
ployee-owner (a term defined by using constructive ownership rules) to prevent tax evasion
or to clearly reflect income-a standard similar to that of § 482. See infra text accompany-
ing notes 115-18.
98. See infra notes 115-18 and accompanying text.
99. See supra note 59-85 and accompanying text.
100. Treas. Reg. § 1.482-1(a)(6) (1962).
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standard is one of arm's-length dealing. In this sense it has ele-
ments closely related to the gratuitous assignment of income doc-
trine, as its result is to determine to whom rather than when in-
come is taxed. On the other hand, a shareholder is entitled to make
transfers to a controlled corporation, including transfers of the
right to collect earned income, without recognition at the time of
the transfer.101
VI. RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN SECTIONS 482 AND 351
The question then arises whether Mr. Foglesong and Dr. Kel-
ler are entitled to transfer to their SC's their right to earn income
at whatever salary they desire, or even at no salary, without exami-
nation under section 482 or otherwise. The Tax Court in Foglesong
and Keller correctly indicated that section 482 does apply. How
then are the provisions of sections 482 and 351 to be reconciled? In
the first instance, they can be reconciled by noting that section 351
applies only to transfers of property to controlled corporations,
and not to transfers of services. It is clear that, to the extent that
stock is received in a controlled corporation in exchange for ser-
vices, income is recognized. 02
As will be discussed below, 03 cases like Foglesong may also
involve a transfer of intangible property that represents an en-
trepreneurial, good will, or going concern value.
A. When Section 482 Applies to a Non-Arm's-Length Property
Transfer to a Controlled Corporation
When dealing with property, several questions concerning the
101. See supra notes 47-58 and accompanying text.
102. See I.R.C. § 351(d)(1) (Supp. V 1981); Tress. Reg. § 1.351-1(a)(1), (2)(ex. 3)
(1955). If no stock is received, the issue is more difficult. In the case of a wholly owned
corporation, it might be argued that the result should be the same, as if stock were received,
since the receipt of stock is essentially meaningless. Cf. Commissioner v. Morgan, 288 F.2d
676 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 836 (1961) (reorganization found on transfer of stock to
controlled corporation even though no stock was distributed as provided in the predecessors
(§§ 112(b)(3) and 112(g)(1)(D) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1939) of I.R.C. §§
354(b)(1)(B) and 368(a)(1)(D) (1976 & Supp. V 1981); Rev. Rul. 81-3, 1981-1 C.B. 125 (par-
tial liquidation treatment on pro rats distribution even though there was no redemption as
provided in § 346(a)(2) (repealed 1982) (current version at § 302(b)(4),(e) (West Supp.
1982)); Rev. Rul. 79-257, 1972-2 C.B. 136 (similar to Rev. Rul. 81-3, but involving wholly
owned subsidiary). Partial liquidation treatment in the absence of an actual redemption was
explicitly endorsed in the legislative history of the TEFRA amendments enacting §
302(b)(4) and repealing § 346(a)(2). See GENERAL EXPLANATION OF THE REVENUE PROVISIONS
OF THE TAX EQUITY AND FISCAL RESPONSIBILITY TAX ACT OF 1982, supra note 15, at 126.
103. See infra notes 115-18 and accompanying text.
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relationship between sections 482 and 351 remain. For one, if there
is a transfer of property at a non-arm's-length price, does section
482 inevitably apply? This issue was raised in Huber Homes, Inc.
v. Commissioner.10 4 In Huber Homes a construction corporation
built houses and transferred them at cost to its controlled subsidi-
ary, which then rented them out. The parties stipulated that an
unrelated buyer would have paid a substantially higher price. The
Service argued that, under section 482, the proper result would be
for the transferor corporation to include as income the excess of
the fair market value of the houses over the price at which they
were transferred. This taxed excess would be reflected as an in-
crease in the basis of the homes held by the subsidiary. The Ser-
vice acknowledged that if the transfer had been without considera-
tion, then no income would have been recognized; but it argued
that since the transfer was in the form of sale, it had to be at arm's
length. The court properly rejected this argument on two grounds:
First, it concluded that section 482 does not permit the "creation
of income"-a rationale rejected in later cases;105 and second, it
recognized that in some cases it is appropriate for a controlling
person to contribute to the capital of his controlled corporation.
On the other hand, numerous cases have applied section 482 to
situations in which a parent sells property to its controlled subsidi-
ary at less than the property's fair market value, and also to other
transfers among controlled entities.106
The question remains, can the differing results be justified?
The solution appears to be that Huber Homes involved a single
transfer of property to be used in the business of the subsidiary.
There was no indication that the subsidiary intended to resell the
property. The latter cases, instead, involved transactions in the or-
dinary course of business of the transferor and transferee-usually
the inventory of both. In such cases, the policy of section 351 to
facilitate transfers to controlled corporations must yield to the pol-
104. 55 T.C. 598 (1971).
105. See, e.g., Latham Park Manor, Inc. v. Commissioner, 69 T.C. 199 (1977) (allocating
interest to subsidiaries on noninterest-bearing loans to parent, even though parent did not
use any part of loan to produce income that could be allocated to the subsidiaries). Al-
though the same result could have been reached by allocating the subsidiaries' interest de-
ductions to the parent, the court did not rely on this argument. The regulations also create
arms-length interest and other charges without finding actual deductions to reallocate. See,
e.g., Tress. Reg. § 1.482-2(a),(b) (1968).
106. See, e.g., E.I. Du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. United States, 608 F.2d 445 (Ct. Cl.
1979); Eli Lilly & Co. v. United States, 372 F.2d 990 (Ct. Cl. 1967). The courts in both cases
allocated to a parent-manufacturer the income in excess of the sales prices of inventory sold
to a subsidiary-distributor.
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icy of section 482 to ensure that the "true taxable income" of vari-
ous controlled entities in the ordinary course of business transac-
tions is properly determined and taxed. In short, the most
reasonable harmonization of the two provisions that adequately
recognizes the policies of both is to apply section 482 to transac-
tions occurring in the ordinary course of business and to apply sec-
tion 351 to transactions that involve the creation of a controlled
corporation and to extraordinary transfers to a controlled corpora-
tion (i.e., not in the ordinary course of business).
The distinction between extraordinary transactions and trans-
actions occurring in the ordinary course of business, however, is
not by itself a sufficient basis for, determining that section 351
rather than section 482 should apply. There are certain one-shot
transactions in which section 482 must be given priority. For ex-
ample, in National Securities Corp. v. Commissioner,10 7 the prede-
cessor of section 482108 was properly applied to allocate back to the
parent-transferor a tax loss on stock where the subsidiary
promptly sold the stock after transfer.0 9 The short period of own-
ership by the subsidiary factually distinguishes National Securi-
ties from Huber Homes. Accordingly, this is not the type of trans-
action that fits within the policy of section 351, because it has no
relation to an ongoing business of the transferee. The blatant at-
tempt to shift the loss in National Securities is clearly the type of
income-shifting that section 482 was designed to prevent.
A further conflict between sections 482 and 351, involving as-
pects of "transfers of the right to collect economically earned in-
come," 110 was dealt with somewhat summarily in Revenue Ruling
80-198. In that ruling, the Service stated (using Rooney v. United
States"' as an illustration) that the nonrecognition principle of
section 351 may not apply to a transfer in which the transferor
takes a deduction for crop expenses before the transfer of the
crops, which were subsequently harvested by the new transferee-
corporation."' Because Revenue Ruling 80-198 allows the transfer
of routine receivables and payables as part of a tax-free incorpora-
107. 137 F.2d 600 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 320 U.S. 794 (1943).
108. Revenue Act of 1936, § 45, 49 Stat. 1648, 1667-68 (current version at I.R.C. § 482
(1976)).
109. Cf. Northwestern Nat'l Bank v. United States, 556 F.2d 889 (8th Cir. 1977) (par-
ent not entitled to contribution deduction for appreciated property distributed by subsidi-
ary as dividend and then promptly donated by parent to charity).
110. See 8upra notes 59-63 and accompanying text.
111. 305 F.2d 681 (9th Cir. 1962); see supra notes 36, 39-40 and accompanying text.
112. Rooney applies I.R.C. § 482 to a similar situation.
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tion, a basis for distinguishing between the transfer of receivables
and payables and the transfer of unharvested crops is needed.
If one type of earned income may be assigned, why should not
this other type be transferable as well? The synthesis of the gen-
eral concepts of clearly reflecting income and the tax benefit prin-
ciple, when applied to the difference between routine and ex-
traordinary transfers, provides a partial basis for generalization.
When cash basis businesses are transferred to controlled corpora-
tions, inevitably there will be some uncollected receivables and
some unpaid expenses; the Code should permit these to be trans-
ferred without immediate recognition of gain or loss. A transfer of
unharvested crops, however, tends to be a one-shot, distorting
event that is less properly condoned by the Code.11 The Service's
position is emphasized in private letter rulings issued in connec-
tion with transfers of cash basis businesses to controlled corpora-
tions.'1 4 In these rulings, the Service routinely requires representa-
tions both that the receivables have not been allowed to
accumulate in an unusual way and that the transferors have not
made extraordinary payments of expenses before transfer. In short,
the principle of allowing certain assignments of income to con-
trolled corporations without recognition does not sanction transac-
tions that deliberately distort accounting principles. Applying this
analysis to Mr. Foglesong and Dr. Keller would result in the taxa-
tion of their pre-incorporation earned income that was not prop-
erly part of the assets of a going business. The proper application
of sections 446 and 482 in all transfers of cash basis businesses to
controlled corporations promotes the congressional policy of facili-
tating incorporation, requires a clear reflection of income, and pro-
hibits abuse caused by extraordinary accounting for the income
rights transferred.
B. Distinction Between the Entrepreneurial and Service
Elements of SC Income
Although tax may be imposed when stock is actually (and pos-
sibly constructively) received for services, a standard is still needed
to determine how to tax the employee-owner after initial incorpo-
ration. The arm's-length standard of section 482 should serve
113. In that sense it may be analogized to National Sec. Corp. v. Commissioner, 137
F.2d 600 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 320 U.S. 794 (1943), which was relied on in Rooney.
114. See, e.g., Pvt. Ltr. Rul. 8220016, IRS LErrER RUL. REP. (CCH) No. 273 (Feb. 11,
1982) (oil and gas business).
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nicely. In applying the arm's-length standard to services in cases
like Foglesong, is it appropriate to allocate almost 100% of the in-
come to the transferor, as was done on remand? The answer is a
resounding "no." The decision on remand in Foglesong was caused
by the taxpayer's failure to prove his case and was probably a reac-
tion to his overly aggressive tax planning. In a business, even a
personal service business such as Mr. Foglesong's or Dr. Keller's,
there are two elements of profits: the personal service element and
the entrepreneurial profit element. The entrepreneurial profit ele-
ment may be defined as the appropriate amount of return on the
risk capital involved, including goodwill.115 Section 482 requires
that Mr. Foglesong and Dr. Keller recognize an adequate amount
of compensation for their personal services, but the general policy
of recognizing SC's as separate entities for income tax purposes re-
quires that they be allowed to accumulate entrepreneurial profit.
Dr. Keller did not try to distinguish between the personal service
and entrepreneurial elements, but simply provided for payment of
his salary in two forms: direct salary and salary paid into his pen-
sion fund-a tax-favored form of compensation. Thus, as the court
held, he clearly met the requirements of section 482. Mr. Fogle-
song, on the other hand, attempted to transfer both elements and,
on remand, simply failed to prove the appropriate amount of the
entrepreneurial profit-income attributable to capital, including
goodwill. The Service's allowance of two percent for the en-
trepreneurial element was probably inadequate, but the Tax Court
was correct on remand because it was Mr. Foglesong's job to estab-
lish the proper amount.
In some ways the question posed in Foglesong and Keller is
the reverse of that posed in Edwin's, Inc. v. United States."6 In
Edwin's, the Service argued that the payment as salary of almost
all of the corporate income of a ladies' specialty shop implied that
part of the salary was a dividend. The facts indicated that the sub-
stantial skill and experience of the shareholder-employee had con-
tributed to the store's outperforming its competitors. The Service
argued that a deduction under section 162 should not be allowed as
115. The Service has recognized that even a professional practice may involve good-
will. See Rev. Rul. 70-45, 1970-1 C.B. 17.
116. 501 F.2d 675 (7th Cir. 1974) (distinguishing Charles McCandless Tile Serv. v.
United States, 422 F.2d 1336 (Ct. Cl. 1970), which held to be a dividend 15% of owner-
employees' compensation, which was equivalent to 60% of corporation's net-profit calcu-
lated before payment of salaries and taxes); see also Griswold, New Light on "A Reasonable
Allowance for Salaries," 59 HARv. L. REv. 286 (1945).
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the compensation was really a distribution of profits. The United
States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit found, however,
that the compensation was reasonable and allowed the deduction.
Revenue Ruling 79-8"1 is based on Edwin's. The Service holds
that deductions for reasonable compensation will not be denied
solely on the ground that the corporation has not paid more than
an insubstantial portion of its earnings as dividends. But the ruling
notes also that the failure to pay dividends is a significant factor to
be taken into account in determining reasonable compensation.
Shareholder-employees are entitled to a reasonable compensa-
tion even if their efforts do not result in any significant en-
trepreneurial profit for their corporation. Conversely, they should
be entitled to limit their compensation to a reasonable amount and
to accumulate the entrepreneurial profit in their corporation. The
burden of distinguishing between the compensatory and en-
trepreneurial elements is, of course, on the taxpayer.""
VII. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION
In conclusion, we should attempt to summarize and apply the
principles outlined above to the five cases with which we started.
Perhaps the easiest case is that of Dr. Keller. Since he owned all of
the corporation's stock, there is no issue of the gratuitous assign-
ment of income." 9 Dr. Keller did not attempt to assign income;
instead, he apportioned it between ordinary income and tax pre-
ferred income, neither of which would escape ultimate taxation.
The court, therefore, properly held that he was not currently taxa-
ble on the deferred income element. Any dissatisfaction with that
result properly required amendment of the pension provisions, as
the Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act did in 1982.120
Frederick Foglesong, who was considerably more aggressive,
deserved to have some of his aggressive tax planning foiled, al-
though probably not to the degree that it was done by the Tax
Court on remand or by the second panel of the Seventh Circuit.
Because he was not the sole shareholder of the corporation, any
notion that the "assignment of income" could not be involved is
117. 1979-1 C.B. 92.
118. See Vogel, Unreasonable Compensation-To What Extent Do Professional Cor-
porations Have the Problem?, S.R.C. QUARTERLY REPORTS, Fall 1981, at 1-2.
119. Dr. Keller was properly taxed, however, to the extent that he attempted to assign
an already earned salary to the corporation. See supra note 14. Such an assignment is not a
normal part of an incorporation of a business and results in a clear distortion of income.
120. See supra note 12.
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clearly erroneous. That Foglesong's children paid $400 for stock on
which they received over $30,000 of dividends in four years indi-
cates that a gratuitous assignment of income was involved to some
degree. The determination of the gratuitous assignment element
must be made in conjunction with the section 482 determination of
his proper arm's-length salary. If the principal issue of section
482's application in this context is whether a shareholder-employee
has received an adequate salary and has left only the "en-
trepreneurial profit" in the corporation,121 reliance solely on sec-
tion 482 tends to disguise the fact that cases like Foglesong also
involve a significant transfer of income to the shareholder-em-
ployee's children. Failure to treat the issues separately has two ad-
ditional results: it tends to disguise the potential for a taxable gift
at the time of the initial organization or at the time of the receipt
of an inadequate salary or both-an issue not explicitly dealt with
in Foglesong-and it confuses the issue of timing the taxation of
Mr. Foglesong on income accumulated for his children. 12 2
Similar principles should apply to Mr. Johnson. The adequacy
of the salary that he received from his controlled corporation
should be analyzed under section 482 without regard to the fact
that the basketball franchises refused to recognize his controlled
corporation. Important tax issues of this type should not turn on
the willingness of the other party to recognize the transaction,
which is merely an issue of bargaining power.
The basic principles that should govern cases like Hempt
Bros. and Raich have been determined properly by the Service in
Revenue Rulings 80-198 and 80-199. 12 Normal transfers of rights
to income, including previously earned receivables, should be al-
lowed without adverse tax consequences. Extraordinary transfers
like those attempted in part by Dr. Keller and Mr. Foglesong, how-
ever, should not escape immediate taxation. Similarly, Revenue
Ruling 80-198 and Rooney correctly suggest that the taxpayer
should be prevented from timing the creation of a corporation if it
results in an extraordinary transfer of income. 124
In short, transfers to newly created corporations, including
service corporations, should result in nonrecognition for transfers
of property, including the right to collect economically earned in-
come that has not been reported, and transfers of previously de-
121. See supra notes 115-18 and accompanying text.
122. See supra note 98 and accompanying text.
123. See supra notes 20-40 and accompanying text.
124. See supra notes 111-14 and accompanying text.
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ducted items. Nonrecognition should not be permitted for trans-
fers that shift the incidents of taxation of extraordinary items (for
example, unharvested crops for which the raising expenses have
been previously deducted or rights to salary already earned) that
are not part of normal incorporation. Of course, transitory, one-
shot transfers must also be prohibited.
In subsequent dealings between the transferee-corporation
and its shareholders, section 482 should apply to ensure that the
employee-shareholder is reasonably compensated, while allowing
the corporation to accumulate the entrepreneurial profit.125 When
other members of the family are shareholders in the corporation,
then the gratuitous assignment of income may also be involved.12 6
Finally, where the transferee does not receive a transferred basis in
the unrealized receivables or previously deducted items that it has
received in the transfer, the transferor must be required to recog-
nize income to clearly reflect income in a tax accounting sense.
27
125. See supra notes 115-18 and accompanying text.
126. See supra notes 92-98 and accompanying text.
127. See supra notes 59-80 and accompanying text.
1983]
